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______ 
Islamic Socio-Legal Norms and 
International Criminal Justice in Context: 
Advancing an ‘Object and Purpose’ cum 
‘Maqáṣid’ Approach 
Mashood A. Baderin* 
3.1. Introduction 
The idea of international criminal justice is underpinned by the need for 
international responsiveness (as opposed to mere reaction) to “the most 
serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole”.1 
Such crimes are committed mostly during armed conflicts without the 
perpetrators being brought to justice by the states in whose jurisdiction 
they are committed, thus prompting the need for international responsive-
ness. Past and ongoing conflicts in different parts of the Muslim world 
such as Iraq, Libya, Syria, and Yemen, in which atrocious crimes have 
been committed by both state and non-state actors, beg the question of 
what role can Islamic norms play in ensuring the effective realisation of 
the objectives of international criminal justice, particularly in the Muslim 
world? Do Islamic social norms generally have anything to contribute to 
the effectiveness of modern international criminal justice? Is Islamic law, 
as some have argued,2 so radically different and unsupportive of interna-
                                                   
* Mashood A. Baderin is a Professor of Laws at the School of Oriental and African Studies 
(SOAS), University of London, United Kingdom. He teaches and researches in the areas of 
Islamic law, international law, human rights law, and law and development in Africa, with 
particular interest in the interaction between human rights law and Islamic law in Muslim-
majority states. He served as the UN Independent Expert on the Situation of Human Rights 
in the Sudan from May 2012 to November 2014. 
1  Statute of the International Criminal Court, 17 July 1998, in force 1 July 2001 (‘ICC Stat-
ute’), Article 5 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/7b9af9/). 
2  See, for example, David A. Westbrook, “Islamic International Law and Public Internation-
al Law: Separate Expressions of World Order”, in Virginia Journal of International Law, 
1993, vol. 33, p. 819; Christopher A. Ford, “Siyar-ization and Its Discontents: International 
Law and Islam’s Constitutional Crisis”, in Texas International Law Journal, 1995, vol. 30, 
p. 499. 
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tional criminal justice, or can it contribute to the effective implementation 
of international criminal justice in the modern world?3 These questions 
have become more pertinent due to the increasing influence of Islamic 
socio-legal norms in many Muslim-majority states today and also the sta-
tus of Islamic law as a recognised legal system in the modern world, with 
growing propositions for the recognition of its principles by international 
tribunals such as the International Court of Justice (‘ICJ’), pursuant to 
Article 38(b) of the ICJ Statute,4 and the International Criminal Court 
(‘ICC’) pursuant to Article 22(1)(c) of the ICC Statute.5  
Like other questions of international law, questions of international 
criminal justice are often addressed monolithically from Western secular 
legal perspectives without much consideration of contributions that other 
worldviews, such as Islam, can make to strengthen its universal ac-
ceptance. With reference to the Muslim world, this chapter proposes that 
Islamic socio-legal norms (broadly defined) have positive potential, which 
can and should be explored to deepen the universal effectiveness of inter-
national criminal justice in today’s world. The chapter disagrees with the 
view that Islamic law is irreconcilable with the concept of international 
criminal justice, and provides a contextual analysis of how the two sys-
tems can complementarily effect the shared objective of a more humane 
world. Also, international criminal justice is often perceived restrictively, 
as a form of punitive justice that is applicable only after the commission 
of heinous crimes that shock the human conscience globally. Much of the 
traditional literature on the subject focuses mainly on punitive justice “in 
the form of international war crimes trials”6 to punish perpetrators of in-
                                                   
3  Michael J. Kelly, “Islam and International Criminal Law: A Brief (In)compatibility Study”, 
in Pace International Law Review Online Companion, 2010, vol. 8, pp. 2–31. 
4  Clark Lombardi, “Islamic Law in the Jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice: 
An Analysis”, in Chicago Journal of International Law, 2007, vol. 1, pp. 85–118; Mas-
hood A. Baderin, “Religion and International Law: Friends or Foes?”, in European Human 
Rights Law Review, 2009, pp. 655–57. See also Statute of the International Court of Justice, 
26 June 1945, Article 38(b) (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/fdd2d2/). 
5  See Mohamed Badar, “Islamic Law (Shariʿa) and the Jurisdiction of the International 
Criminal Court”, in Leiden Journal of International Law, 2011, vol. 24, no. 2, pp. 411–33. 
See also ICC Statute, Article 22(1)(c), supra note 1 (http://www.legal-
tools.org/doc/7b9af9/). 
6  Gideon Boas, “What is International Criminal Justice”, in Gideon Boas, William A. Scha-
bas and Michael P. Scharf (eds.), International Criminal Justice: Legitimacy and Coher-
ence, Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd., Cheltenham, 2012, p. 1. 
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ternational crimes, with the hope that such punishment would serve as a 
legal deterrent against future crimes.7 In view of the debate about whether 
international criminal trials have really succeeded in serving as a deterrent 
against future atrocities,8 this chapter advances a holistic view of interna-
tional criminal justice, not perceived restrictively as a post-conflict puni-
tive concept, but also understood and promoted as a pre-conflict humane 
concept that addresses the social and moral conscience of humanity to 
detest the commission of such heinous crimes in the first place. It advanc-
es a holistic conceptualisation of international criminal justice covering its 
social, moral, political and legal elements in relation to Islamic socio-
legal norms and how that can be explored for enhancing international 
criminal justice, particularly in the Muslim world. 
In addressing the question “What is international criminal justice?”, 
Gideon Boas states:9 
International criminal justice is about more than responses. 
How do we learn from history or sometimes fail to do so? 
Can we use our understanding of human psychology to re-
spond better to mass atrocity, or to prevent or address it 
sooner? What of the sociological elements that are infused in 
our response to heinous international crimes; how do these 
affect our understanding of international criminal justice? 
He then notes that “while as international lawyers we have raised im-
portant questions about legitimacy and coherence, we do not always open 
ourselves to a genuinely multidisciplinary approach to international crim-
inal justice”.10 Relatedly, the need has also been identified for “consider-
ing international criminal justice as a critical [universalist] project”, par-
ticularly with reference to alternative perspectives that question its Euro-
                                                   
7  Cf. Mark Findlay and Ralph Henham (eds.), Beyond Punishment: Achieving International 
Criminal Justice, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2010. 
8  Chris Jenks and Guido Acquaviva, “Debate: The Role of International Criminal Justice in 
Fostering Compliance with International Humanitarian Law”, in International Review of 
the Red Cross, 2014, vol. 96, pp. 775–94; Jennifer Schense and Linda Carter, Two Steps 
Forward One Step Back: The Deterrent Effect of International Criminal Tribunals, Interna-
tional Nuremberg Principles Academy, Nuremberg, 2016. 
9  Boas, 2012, p. 1, see supra note 6. 
10  Ibid. 
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centrism and promote its universal legitimacy.11 Thus, this chapter pro-
poses the need for an inclusive approach to international criminal justice 
that involves learning from our collective human history and accommo-
dating social, moral, political, and legal understandings of relevant norms 
from different civilisations, with specific reference to Islamic socio-legal 
norms, to enhance international responsiveness to heinous crimes that 
shock the conscience of the international community as a whole. 
The social and moral perspectives ask the question ‘why?’ relating 
to the normative foundations of international criminal justice, while the 
political and legal perspectives ask the question ‘what?’ relating to its 
institutional constructions. This reflects the necessary linkage between the 
socio-moral and politico-legal dimensions of international criminal justice. 
International responsiveness to heinous crimes should thus not be restrict-
ed to secular legalistic worldviews, but should also be examined within 
the context of religious and cultural beliefs. People who commit interna-
tional crimes often act on certain distorted beliefs and understandings, 
which need to be challenged by reference to alternative convincing inter-
nal evidence, to win and dissuade minds from committing those atrocities 
in the first place. To effectively dissuade the commission of international 
crimes during armed conflicts in the Muslim world, it is necessary to 
promote a holistic and complementary understanding of the relationship 
between international criminal justice and Islamic socio-legal norms. In 
doing so, this chapter advances a combined application of the ‘object and 
purpose’ principle under international law and the ‘maqáṣid’ principle 
under Islamic law to rationalise the complementary relationship between 
the two systems. 
3.2. ‘Object and Purpose’ and ‘Maqáṣid’ as Comparable Normative 
Principles 
Basically, the concepts of ‘object and purpose’ and ‘maqáṣid’ are compa-
rable normative principles of international law and Islamic law respective-
ly. The object and purpose principle is an international law concept appli-
cable to the law of treaties for ensuring adherence to the primary objective 
of a treaty. The relevancy of this principle lies in the fact that treaties are a 
fundamental basis of international criminal justice and also the most im-
                                                   
11  Julien Pieret and Marie-Laurence Hébert-Dolbec, “International Criminal Justice as a 
Critical Project: Introduction”, in Champ Pénal/Penal Field, 2016, vol. XIII.  
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portant source of international law generally. The effect of the object and 
purpose principle is reflected in eight different articles of the 1969 Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties.12 It is obvious from the provisions 
cited that the object and purpose is the nucleus of a treaty, which the sub-
stantive provisions are aimed to achieve. 
There is some debate about how the object and purpose is to be de-
termined where not specifically stated by the treaty. Nevertheless, there is 
established judicial and academic understanding that the object and pur-
pose can be deduced from a treaty’s historical context or its preamble. 
Hulme notes that “preambles are more frequently cited as sources or evi-
dence of a treaty’s ‘object and purpose’”.13 The preamble normally pro-
vides insight into the context, philosophy and morals underlying a treaty’s 
adoption. Ironically, not much attention is paid to the object and purpose 
of treaties to enhance their moral strength and effectiveness. Hulme fur-
ther argues: “In light of treaties’ longstanding structure […] it is surpris-
                                                   
12  Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (‘VCLT’), 23 May 1969, in force 27 January 
1980 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/6bfcd4/). In ascending order, Article 18 of the VCLT 
obligates states “to refrain from acts that would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty”; 
Article 19(c) prohibits states from entering any reservation that “is incompatible with the 
object and purpose of [a] treaty”; Article 20(2) provides that a reservation to a treaty will 
require the acceptance by all parties to the treaty, when it appears from the object and pur-
pose of the treaty that the application of the treaty in its entirety between all the parties is 
an essential condition for each one to be bound by the treaty; Article 31(3) provides that a 
treaty shall be interpreted in good faith “in the light of its object and purpose”; Article 33(4) 
provides that the object and purpose of a treaty shall be a reference point in resolving any 
differences of meaning in different authentic texts of the treaty; Article 41(1)(b)(ii) pro-
vides that two or more parties to a multi-lateral treaty may only agree to modify the treaty 
as between themselves alone if the modification in question is, inter alia, not incompatible 
with the effective execution of the object and purpose of the treaty as a whole; Article 
58(1)(b)(ii) provides that two or more parties to a multi-lateral treaty may only agree to 
suspend the application of provisions of the treaty temporarily as between themselves if 
the suspension in question “is not incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty”; 
and Article 60(3)(b) provides that “violation of a provision essential to the accomplishment 
of the object and purpose of [a] treaty” constitutes a material breach of the treaty. 
13  Max H. Hulme, “Preambles in Treaty Interpretation”, in University of Pennsylvania Law 
Review, 2016, vol. 164, p. 1300. For an earlier judicial position, see the dissenting opinion 
of Judge Anzilotti in the Permanent Court of International Justice (‘PCIJ’), Advisory Opin-
ion in Interpretation of the Convention of 1919 Concerning Employment of Women Dur-
ing the Night, (1932) PCIJ, Series A/B, No. 50, pp. 383–89 (http://www.legal-
tools.org/doc/1839b9/). See also Isabelle Buffard and Karl Zemanek, “The ‘Object and 
Purpose’ of a Treaty: An Enigma?”, in Australian Review of International and European 
Law, 1998, vol. 3, pp. 311–43. 
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ing that the ubiquitous preamble has received so little attention”.14 Atten-
tion is often placed mainly on the substantive provisions of a treaty to the 
detriment of the preamble, which is usually considered as having no bind-
ing effect.15 Although its binding nature is debatable, the moral value of 
the preamble as repository of a treaty’s object and purpose is settled. Thus, 
the moral justification of a treaty is in its object and purpose, which 
should be evoked to advance universal acceptance of the international 
norm conveyed by the treaty. 
As the object and purpose principle applies generally to internation-
al treaties, it is applicable to all treaties relating to international criminal 
justice such as international humanitarian law, international human rights 
law and international criminal law, as will be analysed later. We can aim 
to identify the object and purpose of each of these specific areas of inter-
national law from the respective treaty preambles and their historical con-
texts. This provides an objective and common moral yardstick for recon-
ciling the norms of international criminal justice with relevant Islamic 
norms. As academic efforts to reconcile Islamic norms with international 
norms are sometimes misconceived as questionable attempts to simply 
subjugate Islamic norms to international norms, identifying and advancing 
the object and purpose of the respective international norm provides an 
objective moral justificatory basis of complementarity between the two 
systems.  
Similarly, the concept of maqáṣid is also a normative principle of 
Islamic law formulated by classical Islamic jurists to promote a contextual 
understanding of Sharí‘ah provisions. The full Arabic terminology for the 
principle is ‘maqáṣid al-Sharí‘ah’, which has been translated variously in 
the English language as “objects and purposes of the Sharí‘ah”,16 “aims 
and intentions of the law”,17 “existential purpose of the law”,18 “higher 
                                                   
14  Hulme, 2016, p. 1283, see supra note 13. 
15  Ibid., p. 1285. 
16  Mashood A. Baderin, International Human Rights and Islamic Law, Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 2003, p. 40. 
17  Wael B. Hallaq, A History of Islamic Legal Theories, Cambridge University Press, Cam-
bridge, 1997, p. 167 
18  Ibid., p. 168. 
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objectives of Islamic law”,19 “higher intents of Islamic law”20 “goals and 
purposes of the Sharí‘ah”,21 “the goals and objectives of Islamic law”22 
and “philosophy of Islamic law”.23 It is similar in many ways to the object 
and purpose principle under international law. For Muslims, the Sharí‘ah 
(consisting of the Qur’án and the Sunnah) is the fundamental source from 
which all Islamic norms draw validity. The Qur’án contains the divine 
and immutable injunctions of God while the Sunnah depicts the practices 
of Prophet Muḥammad as reported in authentic aḥádíth (Traditions). The 
provisions of both sources are, however, subject to human speculative 
interpretations, which can be either literal or contextual. Literal interpreta-
tions can often lead to out-of-context and reductionist understandings of 
the Sharí‘ah. Thus, the classical Islamic jurists formulated the concept of 
maqáṣid to ensure that the provisions of the Sharí‘ah are not interpreted 
contrary to its intended objectives. 
Based on Qur’ánic verses such as “God desires ease for you, and 
desires not hardship for you”,24 “God does not desire to make any imped-
iment for you”,25 “[God] has laid on you no impediment in your reli-
gion”,26 “We have not sent thee [Muḥammad], save as a mercy unto all 
beings”,27 “Now there has come to you a Messenger from among your-
selves, grievous to him is your suffering”;28 and authentic Traditions of 
the Prophet such as “Verily the religion is easy, and no one overstretches 
himself in the religion except that it crushes him, so be moderate and try 
                                                   
19  Ahmad Al-Raysuni (translated by Nancy Roberts), Imam Shatibi’s Theory of the Higher 
Objectives and Intents of Islamic Law, The International Institute of Islamic Thought, 
Washington, 2005, p. xxi. 
20  Gamal Eldin Attia, Towards Realization of the Higher Intents of Islamic Law, The Interna-
tional Institute of Islamic Thought, Washington, D.C., 2007. 
21  M. Cherif Bassiouni, The Shariʿa and Islamic Criminal Justice in Time of War and Peace, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2014, p. 68. 
22  Mohammad Hashim Kamali, “Maqáṣid Al-Sharí‘ah: The Objectives of Islamic Law”, in 
Islamic Studies, 1999, vol. 38, no. 2, pp. 193–208. 
23  Jasser Auda, Maqasid Al-Shariah as Philosophy of Islamic Law: A Systems Approach, 
International Institute of Islamic Thought, London, 2007. 
24  The Qur’án (translation by Arthur J. Arberry), 2:184. 
25  Ibid., 5:6. 
26  Ibid., 22:78. 
27  Ibid., 21:107. 
28  Ibid., 9:128. 
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to be near perfection and take glad tidings”,29 “The best of your religion is 
that which is easiest, the best of your religion is that which is easiest”,30 
and “Make things easy and do not make things difficult, give glad tidings 
and do not put people off”;31 the classical Islamic jurists identified the 
general maqáṣid of the Sharí‘ah as the promotion of human well-being 
(al-moṣalaḥah) and prevention of harm (mafsadah), often referred to col-
lectively as al-moṣalaḥah. This concept of al-moṣalaḥah may be per-
ceived narrowly as promoting only the well-being of the Muslim commu-
nity (ummah) specifically or broadly as promoting the well-being of hu-
manity generally. Obviously, perceiving it broadly as the well-being of 
humanity generally is more consistent with international norms. The pri-
mary Islamic jurisprudential position is that the maqáṣid of the Sharí‘ah is 
to promote the well-being of humanity generally, which also incorporates 
the well-being of the Muslim ummah. This is evidenced by the Qur’án’s 
description of God as “[t]he Lord of men”,32 “[t]he Lord of all Being”33 
and of the Prophet as “a mercy unto all beings”.34 However, where the 
well-being of the Muslim ummah is endangered, then the maqáṣid would, 
justifiably, revolve to protecting the well-being of the Muslim ummah 
specifically. Thus, similar to the object and purpose principle under inter-
national law, the maqáṣid principle is for ensuring adherence to the objec-
tives of the Sharí‘ah, deducible from the Qur’án and the Sunnah as pro-
moting human well-being generally. 
Although the notion of maqáṣid al-Sharí‘ah had been in use infor-
mally much earlier,35 the fourteenth century Andalusian Islamic jurist Abú 
Isháq Al-Shátibí is considered generally to be its formal initiator owing to 
his contribution to its formal recognition as we know it today. In his re-
nowned Islamic jurisprudential work, Al-Muwáfaqát fí Usúl al-Shari‘ah, 
                                                   
29  Reported by Al-Bukhári, Book 2, ḥadíth 39. 
30  Reported by Musnad Ahmad (3/479). 
31  Reported by Al-Bukhári, Book 3, ḥadíth 69. 
32  The Qur’án, 114:1, see supra note 24. The verse is “rabb al-Nás” in Arabic. While the 
term “al-Nás” is often translated as ‘men’ in English, as in Arberry’s translation here, this 
should not be misconstrued genderwise as meaning the plural of ‘man’ and thus excluding 
women, but construed as meaning ‘mankind’ or humans generally, and thus ‘rabb al-Nás’ 
should be contextually understood as meaning “[t]he Lord of all mankind”. 
33  Ibid., 1:1. 
34  Ibid., 21:107. 
35  Kamali, 1999, p. 2, see supra note 22. 
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Al-Shátibí noted that the original intention of God in revealing the Sha-
rí‘ah is to protect human well-being and thus in interpreting any verse of 
the Qur’án or Tradition of the Prophet, care must be taken not to contra-
dict the general objective of the Sharí‘ah which is maṣlaḥah. He consid-
ered the maqáṣid as a necessary principle for proper jurisprudential rea-
soning (ijtihád) in Islamic law.36 Today, the maqáṣid principle is acknowl-
edged by most contemporary Islamic scholars and jurists as the necessary 
jurisprudential tool for reconciling Islamic law with different contempo-
rary issues such as human rights and humanitarian law generally. For ex-
ample, Kamali has observed that the maqáṣid principle is an evidently 
important theme of the Sharí‘ah and that “the Sharí‘ah generally is predi-
cated on benefits to the individual and the community, and its laws are 
designed so as to protect these benefits and to facilitate the improvement 
and perfection of the conditions of human life on earth”.37  Thus, the 
maqáṣid principle provides a proper contextual approach for advancing 
the benevolent scope of Islamic law. 
Apart from the general maqáṣid of the Sharí‘ah, there is also recog-
nition that each specific area of Islamic law, such as Islamic family law, 
Islamic humanitarian law and Islamic international law, has its respective 
objective (maqṣúd) within the context of the general maqáṣid. Thus, the 
maqáṣid principle will be employed to explore the role of Islamic socio-
legal norms in enhancing international criminal justice, particularly in the 
Muslim world, by reference to relevant provisions of the Qur’án and the 
Sunnah in relation to both the general maqáṣid of the Sharí‘ah and the 
specific maqṣúd of identified areas of Islamic law relevant to international 
criminal justice. 
From the above analysis of these two comparable normative princi-
ples, it is obvious that both international law and Islamic law are not insti-
tuted or meant to be applied in abstracto. Rather, both systems were insti-
tuted to achieve identifiable objectives, the appreciation of which is nec-
essary for establishing an objective relationship between the two systems. 
Generally, these two respective principles of international law and Islamic 
law provides the basis for a common objective of attaining a more hu-
                                                   
36  Ibrahim Al-Shatibi (translated by Imran Ahsan Khan Nyazee), The Reconciliation of the 
Fundamentals of Islamic Law, Al-Muwáfaqát fí Úṣúl Al-Sharí‘a, vols. 1 and 2, Garnet 
Publishing Ltd., 2012, p. 229. 
37  Kamali, 1999, p. 229, see supra note 22. 
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mane world, which can be evoked for promoting a complementary rela-
tionship between the two systems. 
3.3. The Basis of International Criminal Justice in Relation to 
Islamic Socio-Legal Norms 
Today, certain acts are considered international crimes for which perpetra-
tors must be brought to justice, based “largely on the notion that some 
crimes are so heinous that they offend the interest of all humanity, and, 
indeed, imperil civilization itself”.38 Thus, international criminal justice is 
essentially linked to international humanitarian law, which regulates and 
puts constraints on the conduct of warfare; international human rights law, 
which promotes the protection of human dignity; and international crimi-
nal law, which prohibits and prescribes punishments for certain core 
crimes under international law. These three specialised areas of interna-
tional law may be described as the three pillars of the international crimi-
nal justice system, as they together provide the substantive basis for 
which international criminal justice applies. For example, ‘war crimes’ 
and ‘genocide’ are two of the substantive crimes punishable under interna-
tional criminal law, with the former being a consequence of the violation 
of core norms of international humanitarian law and the latter being a 
consequence of the violation of the norms of international human rights 
law. Thus, an appreciation of international humanitarian law, international 
human rights law and international criminal law as the basis of interna-
tional criminal justice is essential for an effective preventive international 
criminal justice system. For example, it is when the rules of international 
humanitarian law are violated that the need to punish war crimes arises 
under international criminal justice. Thus, promoting adherence to inter-
national humanitarian law is essential to preventing the occurrence of war 
crimes in the first place. Similarly, respect for international human rights 
law would prevent the occurrence of atrocities such as genocide, while 
respect for international criminal law would automatically ensure a pre-
ventive international criminal justice system. 
While international humanitarian law, international human rights 
law and international criminal law are all international legal regimes, they 
                                                   
38  Leila Nadya Sadat, “Competing and Overlapping Jurisdiction”, in M. Cherif Bassiouni 
(ed.), International Criminal Law, vol. 2, 3rd ed., Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden, 
2008, p. 207. 
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are evidently motivated by morals and humaneness, which are important 
factors for promoting adherence to them. In relation to the Muslim world, 
linking the morals underlying international humanitarian law, internation-
al human rights law, and international criminal law to Islamic socio-legal 
norms can go a long way to ensure adherence to these international nor-
mative regimes. Thus, a better contextual understanding of the relation-
ship between Islamic socio-legal norms and international criminal justice 
first requires an Islamic socio-legal connection with each one of interna-
tional humanitarian law, international human rights law and international 
criminal law as the basis of international criminal justice. 
3.3.1. Islamic Socio-Legal Connection with International 
Humanitarian Law 
Bassiouni traced the history of warfare back to the biblical account of 
Cain’s murder of his brother Abel, which also has an Islamic account in 
the Qur’án,39 noting that what started with brother against brother subse-
quently “turned to family against family, tribe against tribe, and nation 
against nation”,40 as is witnessed today. He observed that “between 1945 
and 2008 there were an estimated 313 conflicts, which collectively result-
ed in the killing of an estimated one hundred million persons, excluding 
other human and material harm”.41 The numbers have escalated greatly 
since 2008. The morality of such human annihilation and harm is difficult 
to justify from both an Islamic or secular point of view. Wars have been 
traditionally fought with brutality aimed at total destruction of the enemy 
and resulting in the commission of heinous atrocities, devastation and 
great human suffering. In light of the difficulty in preventing warfare 
completely, the realistic option, from ancient times, was to aim at regulat-
ing the conduct of warfare to limit, on humanitarian grounds, the devasta-
tion of war. This was first achieved through customary rules and subse-
quently through formal treaty law in modern times.42 The regulation of 
                                                   
39  The Islamic account of this incident is in the Qur’án, 5:12–31, which rounds up with two 
important verses proscribing arbitrary killing and mischief on Earth at 5:32–33. 
40  M. Cherif Bassiouni, “Perspectives on International Criminal Justice”, in Virginia Journal 
of International Law, 2010, vol. 50, no. 2, pp. 278–79. 
41  Ibid., p. 280. 
42  See, for example, Michael Howard, George Andreopoulos and Mark R. Shulman (eds.), 
The Laws of War: Constraints of Warfare in the Western World, Yale University Press, Yale, 
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warfare in ancient times was not limited to one civilisation, nor is it solely 
a Western concern in modern times. Alexander has succinctly observed:43 
Laws of war have always existed to limit the destruction of 
war. The ancients, the knights of the middle ages, the jurists 
of the early modern period all testify to the record of this 
concern. Nor is it just a Western concern. Other cultures, 
such as China, Japan, India and the Islamic world, have their 
own traditions of rules of warfare. Yet, despite this universal 
concern, the attempt to limit war has suffered various set-
backs. It was not until the 19th century that a movement to 
codify the laws of war began and modern international hu-
manitarian law was born. 
The historical context of international humanitarian law44 and the 
preambles of relevant international humanitarian law instruments45 clearly 
indicate that the general object and purpose of international humanitarian 
law is to diminish the evils of war, promote humanitarianism in war and 
lessen the horrors, evils and unnecessary human suffering in warfare, 
through international political and legal co-operation. For example, the 
preamble of the second Hague Convention with Respect to the Laws and 
Customs of War on Land of 1899 states, inter alia, that its provisions had 
“been inspired by the desire to diminish the evils of war so far as military 
necessities permit”.46 Similarly, the Preamble of the third Hague Conven-
tion for the Adaptation to Maritime Warfare of 1899 states that the Pleni-
potentiaries were “animated by the desire to diminish, as far as depends 
on them the evils inseparable from warfare”.47 Also, the Preamble of the 
Geneva Convention (IV) of 1949 states that its purpose is for the protec-
                                                                                                                        
1997; Leslie C. Green, The Contemporary Law of Armed Conflict, 3rd ed., Manchester 
University Press, Manchester, 2008, Chapter 2.  
43  Amanda Alexander, “A Short History of International Humanitarian Law”, in European 
Journal of International Law, 2015, vol. 26, no. 1, pp. 111–12. 
44  See, for example, Henry Dunant, A Memory of Solferino, International Committee of the 
Red Cross, Geneva, 1939; Frits Kalshoven and Liesbeth Zegveld, Constraints on the Wag-
ing of War: An Introduction, 4th ed., Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2011. 
45  See, generally, the ICC Legal Tools Database for all these instruments. 
46  Hague Convention (II) with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 29 July 
1899, Preamble (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/7879ac/). 
47  Hague Convention (III) for the Adaptation to Maritime Warfare of the Principles of the 
Geneva Convention of 22 August 1864, 18 October 1907, Preamble (http://www.legal-
tools.org/doc/7465fa/). 
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tion of civilian persons in times of war.48 This object and purpose of inter-
national humanitarian law is based on morals and humaneness acknowl-
edgeable universally, including under Islamic socio-legal norms. 
Evidently, the concept of international humanitarian law is con-
sistent with Islamic socio-legal norms. Its object and purpose as identified 
above is in consonance with the general maqáṣid of the Sharí‘ah and the 
specific maqṣúd of humanitarian law in Islamic jurisprudence.49  Islam 
recognised the need for constraint in warfare as early as the time of 
Prophet Muḥammad in the seventh century, as evidenced by his consistent 
instructions to the Muslim army urging restraint and humanitarianism in 
war. Bassiouni has noted that these early instructions of the Prophet later 
formed the basis of the traditional rules of armed conflict under Islamic 
law of nations (al-siyar) later “codified in the eighth century CE by Al-
Shaybáni (d. 189/804) in his famous book Al-Siyar [which] […] constitut-
ed the most developed articulation of international humanitarian law until 
the twentieth century CE, when the foundations of modern customary and 
conventional international humanitarian laws were laid”. 50  Similar to 
modern international humanitarian law, Islamic law prohibits mutilations, 
unnecessary destructions, unnecessary bloodshed, unnecessary human 
suffering, and excesses in warfare.51 These regulations were derived from 
the Sharí‘ah, the practices of the early Caliphs, and from treaty obliga-
tions. The general tone for constraint in warfare under Islamic law is set in 
the Qurʼánic text 2:190, prohibiting excesses in the conduct of war: “Fight 
in the cause of God those who fight you but do not exceed limits; for God 
does not love those who exceed limits”. This Qur’ánic provision clearly 
indicates that there are limits in warfare that should not be exceeded under 
Islamic law. The details of these limits are found in the recorded traditions 
of Prophet Muḥammad and the practices of the orthodox Caliphs after 
him. It is recorded that during his lifetime, whenever the Prophet 
                                                   
48  Geneva Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 12 
August 1949, in force 21 October 1950, Preamble (http://www.legal-
tools.org/doc/d5e260/). 
49  Karima Bennoune, “As-Salámu Alaykum?: Humanitarian Law in Islamic Jurisprudence”, 
in Michigan Journal of International Law, 1994, vol. 15, no 4. pp. 605–43. 
50  Bassiouni, 2014, p. 162, see supra note 21. 
51  See, for example, Muḥammad Hamidullah, The Muslim Conduct of State, 7th ed., Sh. 
Muḥammad Ashraf Kashmir Bazar, Lahore, 1977; Syed Imad-ud-Din Asad, “Islamic Hu-
manitarian Law”, in Dawn, 24 February 2006. 
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Muḥammad appointed a commander for warfare, he enjoined him with 
God-consciousness and gave orders for restraint in warfare, for example, 
as follows:52 
[N]ever commit breach of trust nor treachery nor mutilate 
anybody nor kill any minor or woman. This is the pact of 
God and the conduct of His Messenger for your guidance 
[…] In avenging the injuries inflicted upon us molest not the 
harmless inmates of domestic seclusion; spare the weakness 
of the female sex; injure not the infants at the breast or those 
who are ill in bed. Refrain from demolishing the houses of 
unresisting inhabitants; destroy neither the means of subsist-
ence, nor their fruit-trees and touch not the palm […] and do 
not kill children. 
This practice was sustained and followed by the four orthodox Ca-
liphs after the Prophet and by subsequent Muslim leaders after them. It is 
reported that the first Caliph, Abú Bakr, also instructed the Muslim army, 
for example, as follows:53 
When you meet your enemies in the fight, behave yourself as 
befits a good Muslim […] If [God] gives you victory, do not 
abuse your advantages and beware not to stain your swords 
with the blood of the one who yields, neither you touch the 
children, the women, nor the infirm men whom you may 
find among your enemies. In your march through enemy ter-
ritory, do not cut down the palm, or other fruit-trees, destroy 
not the products of the earth, ravage no fields, burn no hous-
es […] Let no destruction be made without necessity […] Do 
not disturb the quiet of the monks and the hermits, and de-
stroy not their abodes. 
Similar orders were issued by the other three orthodox Caliphs 
Umar, Uthmán and Alí, respectively.54 Based on classical Islamic sources, 
Hamidullah has identified that acts prohibited in warfare under Islamic 
law include unnecessary cruel and tortuous ways of killing, killing non-
combatants, decapitation of prisoners of war, mutilation of humans or 
beasts, treachery and perfidy, devastation, destruction of harvests and 
unnecessary cutting of trees, excess and wickedness, adultery and fornica-
                                                   
52  Bennoune, 1994, p. 624, see supra note 49. 
53  Ibid., p. 626. 
54  Ibid., p. 627; Hamidullah, 1977, pp. 299–311, see supra note 51. 
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tion even with captive women, killing enemy hostages, severing the head 
of fallen enemies, massacre, burning captured humans or animals to death, 
using poisonous arrows, and acts forbidden under treaties.55 Thus, all such 
atrocities committed, purportedly in the name of Islam, by extremist 
groups such as ISIS in Iraq and Syria, Boko Ḥarám in Nigeria, and Al-
Shabáb in Somalia and Kenya, are not only contrary to international hu-
manitarian law but also violate the rules of warfare under Islamic law, and 
are therefore punishable under both systems of law. 
Similar to the object and purpose of international humanitarian law, 
the maqáṣid of the constraints on warfare under Islamic law is principally 
to promote humanitarianism in war and lessen the horrors, evils and un-
necessary human suffering in warfare. General observance of these rules 
and reciprocity from the enemy can only be achieved through internation-
al political and legal co-operation as recognised under the principle of 
‘co-operation for goodness and righteousness’ (ta‘áwwun alá al-birr wa-
al-taqwá) enjoined on Muslims in the Qurʼánic text 5:2: “Help one anoth-
er to piety and godfearing; do not help each other to sin and enmity”. 
Such international co-operation is pertinent through ratification of treaties, 
as is reflected in relevant verses of the Qur’án, the Traditions of the 
Prophet and practices of the Caliphs after him. For example, the Qurʼánic 
text 8:58 refers to the sanctity of treaties and permissibility of reciprocity 
in breach of a treaty: “And if thou fearest treachery any way at the hands 
of a people [with whom you have entered a treaty], dissolve it [their treaty] 
with them equally; surely God loves not the treacherous”. The Prophet is 
also reported to have stated in a Tradition: “Whoever has a treaty of peace 
with a people should not loosen or tighten it [beyond its terms] until the 
treaty reaches its appointed term. Otherwise, he should declare the treaty 
null and void so that they are both on equal terms”.56 
Similar to international humanitarian law treaties, it is interesting to 
note that the Qur’án does not attach specific sanctions to the violations of 
the specified humanitarian rules by soldiers during warfare. Often, the 
belief in God’s reward for complying with the injunctions and possibility 
of punishment in the hereafter for its violation provided religious and 
conscientious incentives and deterrents respectively for compliance by 
                                                   
55  Hamidullah, 1977, pp. 205–08, see supra note 51. 
56  Reported by Abú Dáwúd, taken from Shayka Safiur-Raḥmán Al Mubarakpuri et al. (eds.), 
Tassir Ibn Kathir (abridged), Darussalam, London, 2003, p. 343. 
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Muslim soldiers in warfare. However, where the violation of the rules of 
warfare amounted to one of the ḥudúd offences under Islamic law, the 
prescribed ḥadd punishment will be applicable. Otherwise, the State can 
impose discretionary (ta‘zír) punishments for violations of the rules of 
warfare either through national law or international humanitarian law trea-
ties ratified by the State pursuant to international co-operation in punish-
ing such atrocities. The State is morally and legally bound to comply with 
such treaty obligations as enjoined in the Qurʼánic text 5:1: “O Believers, 
fulfil your bonds”, which is considered to be the basis for fulfilling inter-
national treaty obligations under Islamic law.57 
The common objective between international humanitarian law and 
Islamic law, as established above, provides a strong basis for universal 
condemnation and punishment of the violations of the common rules of 
warfare by extremist groups who purport to act in the name of Islam in 
different parts of the Muslim world today. 
3.3.2. Islamic Socio-Legal Connection with International Human 
Rights Law 
international human rights law is another basis for international criminal 
justice. The Preamble of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(‘UDHR’) states that “disregard and contempt for human rights have re-
sulted in barbarous acts which have outraged the conscience of man-
kind”.58 Where international human rights law is respected, most of the 
concerns of international criminal justice would be automatically resolved. 
From its historical context and the preambular statements of the UDHR 
and other international human rights treaties, it is obvious that the general 
object and purpose of international human rights law is to compel all 
states to recognise, promote and protect respect for the inherent dignity of 
all human beings without discrimination. This is an essential foundation 
of freedom, justice, and world peace.  
Respect for human dignity is among the common norms of humani-
ty, and falls within the concept of ‘al-ma‘rúf’ (common good) in Islamic 
socio-legal terms, the promotion of which the Sharí‘ah enjoins under the 
                                                   
57  See, for example, Labeeb Ahmed Bsoul, International Treaties (Mu‘áhadát) in Islam, 
University Press of America, Lanham, 2008, p. 126. 
58  Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 10 December 1948, preambular paragraph 2 
(http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/de5d83/). 
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doctrine ‘amr bi al-ma‘rúf wa nahy ‘an al-munkar’ (enjoining the right or 
honourable and forbidding the wrong or dishonourable).59 Each interna-
tional human rights treaty also has its specific object and purpose. For 
example, it is acknowledged that the specific object and purpose of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights is to create legally 
binding standards for the guarantee of the civil and political rights of all 
individuals by states,60 which is also justifiable in Islamic law under the 
principle of ta‘áwwun (co-operation) as discussed earlier above.  
From an Islamic perspective, the general object and purpose of in-
ternational human rights law is in consonance with the maqáṣid of the 
Sharí‘ah, which is promotion of human well-being as already analysed 
above. The basic Qur’ánic provision that expresses the general maqáṣid 
of upholding human dignity in relation to the promotion and protection of 
human rights is the Qurʼánic text 17:70, which states clearly that God has 
bestowed innate honour and dignity on every human being, which must 
be respected: 
We have honoured the children of Adam [that is, human be-
ings], and carried them on land and sea, and provided them 
with good things, and preferred them greatly over many of 
those We created. 
This is, essentially, a reminder of the sacred nature of human dignity, 
which the State has a duty under Islamic law to uphold and establish insti-
                                                   
59  This phrase is “[u]sed in the Quran nine times, referring to the collective duty of the Mus-
lim community to encourage righteous behaviour and discourage immorality, as recog-
nized by reason and the Islamic moral and legal system. Aims to remove oppression from 
society and instead establish justice. Applied to moral, social, political, and economic fac-
ests of life. It is, ideally, the distinguishing trait of the Muslim nation”, see John L. Esposi-
to (ed.), The Oxford Dictionary of Islam, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2003, p. 19. For 
a discussion of the rules on the application of this doctrine under Islamic law and its mis-
application by the defendant in the Al-Mahdi case before the ICC, see Mohamed Elewa 
Badar and Noelle Higgins, “Discussion Interrupted: The Destruction and Protection of 
Cultural Property under International Law and Islamic Law – The Case of Prosecutor v Al-
Mahdi”, in International Criminal Law Review, 2017, vol. 17, no. 3, pp. 494–95. See also, 
Michael Cook, Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong in Islamic Thought, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 2000. 
60  See, for example, United Nations Human Rights Committee, CCPR General Comment No. 
24: Issues Relating to Reservations Made upon Ratification or Accession to the Covenant 
or the Optional Protocols thereto, or in Relation to Declarations under Article 41 of the 
Covenant, UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.6, 4 November 1994, para. 7 
(https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/4acd3b/). 
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tutions to protect. This could be either through national law or relevant 
treaties ratified by the State pursuant to international co-operation. The 
Preamble of the Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam declares the 
wish of Muslim-majority states “to contribute to the efforts of mankind to 
assert human rights, to protect man from exploitation and persecution, and 
to affirm his freedom and right to a dignified life in accordance with the 
Islamic Sharí‘ah”.61 It further states that the fundamental rights and uni-
versal freedoms are an integral part of Islam and are binding divine com-
mandments, which no one has the right to suspend, violate or ignore. 
There is also a vast contemporary literature aimed at establishing the con-
cept of human rights from within Islamic classical jurisprudence and iden-
tifying a common moral ground and linkage between the general object 
and purpose of international human rights law and the general maqáṣid of 
the Sharí‘ah.62 
Today, it is well acknowledged that international human rights law 
is applicable both in peacetime and wartime and gross violations of hu-
man rights in warfare could lead to committing international crimes. The 
former United Nations (‘UN’) Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, observed 
in his 2004 report on the rule of law and transitional justice in conflict and 
post-conflict societies that one of the UN’s main objectives in establishing 
criminal tribunals is to bring to justice to “those responsible for serious 
violations of human rights and humanitarian law, [and] putting an end to 
such violations and preventing their recurrence, securing justice and dig-
nity for victims”.63 The active promotion of respect for human rights can 
be an important means of ensuring preventive international criminal jus-
tice that discourages the commission of war crimes and genocide during 
armed conflicts. Atrocities, such as the Bosnia-Herzegovina and Rwanda 
                                                   
61  Organisation of the Islamic Conference, Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam, 5 
August 1990, preambular paragraph 2, available on the Refworld web site. 
62  See, for example, Mashood A. Baderin, International Human Rights and Islamic Law, 
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genocides, have shown that actions that lead to war crimes and genocide 
often start with extreme dehumanisation of the ‘other’ by distorting an 
opponent’s image and projecting them as less human or not human at all, 
which then validates brutalities against them. With regard to the Muslim 
world, promoting international human rights law as an important pillar of 
international criminal justice through emphasising its general object and 
purpose with reference to relevant Islamic socio-legal norms and the 
maqáṣid of the Sharí‘ah, will enhance its acceptability and effectiveness. 
3.3.3. Islamic Socio-Legal Connection with International Criminal 
Law 
The normative foundation of international criminal law is to criminalise 
and punish violations of some core norms of international humanitarian 
law and international human rights law. However, regulation of crime is 
traditionally a domestic responsibility rather than an international one. 
Crimes are based on some notion of social wrong as recognised within 
particular societies, which thus creates divergence as to what constitutes 
crimes from one domestic system to the other. Criminalisation evinces 
social control, whereby certain acts are identified as morally and socially 
unacceptable within a particular society and punishment is legally as-
cribed for committing such acts to reflect some sense of justice in society. 
Thus, the concept of international criminal law reflects some element of 
global social control based on a universal notion of social wrongs ac-
ceptable by all. This was initially confronted with both substantive and 
procedural challenges. First, there was the challenge of creating an inter-
national agreement on social wrongs that would be accepted as crimes 
universally and, second, the challenge of international agreement about 
the procedure for trying and punishing such international crimes. In his 
2010 article “Some Objections to the International Criminal Court”, Ru-
bin observed that the creation of the ICC “assumes that there is such a 
thing as international criminal law. But what is its substance? Who exer-
cises law-making authority for the international legal community? Who 
has the legal authority to interpret the law once supposedly found?”.64 
This, he argues, arises from the fact that criminal law is different from 
civil claims, with the traditional position being that crimes are “not […] 
                                                   
64  Alfred P. Rubin, “Some Objections to the International Criminal Court”, in Peace Review, 
2000, vol. 12, no. 1, p. 45. 
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defined by international law as such” but rather “by the municipal laws of 
many states and in a few cases by international tribunals set up by victor 
states in an exercise of positive law making” with the tribunal’s new rules 
being “accepted under one rationale or another, by the states in which the 
accused were nationals”. One rationale was that “if all or nearly all ‘civi-
lised’ states define particular acts as violating their municipal criminal 
laws, then those acts violate ‘international law’”. Another rationale was 
that some acts violate “general principles of law recognised by civilised 
states”, and thus violate general international law.65 The rationale of inter-
national criminal law is thus very much tied to its acceptance in divergent 
municipal orders based on shared human values. 
Certainly, there are acts that would be considered morally and so-
cially unacceptable within the international community, either due to their 
negative impact on international relations or the indignation they cause to 
the conscience of the international community as a whole, and thus the 
need to socially control such acts directly or indirectly through interna-
tional law. One old example is the crime of piracy. As observed by Hyde, 
piracy “derives its internationally illegal character from the will of the 
international society”. 66  Although not categorised as an international 
crime stricto sensu, piracy has long been considered the grandfather of 
transnational crimes, conferred with universal jurisdiction as early as the 
eighteenth century because of the recognisable threat it poses to the mari-
time interests of all states both individually and collectively. Pirates could 
thus be prosecuted and punished by any state that caught them, even 
though they committed their crime elsewhere. 
Over time, the concept of international criminal law as the basis for 
international criminal justice has become legally solidified, first through 
customary international law and then through treaty law.67 Today, geno-
cide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and the crime of aggression are 
considered as the core crimes under international criminal law, obviously 
due to the indignation they cause to the conscience of the international 
community as a whole. It is unlikely that there is any state or society to-
                                                   
65  Ibid. 
66  Charles C. Hyde, International Law, Chiefly as Interpreted and Applied by the United 
States, rev. ed., Little, Brown and Company, Massachusetts, 1945, pp. 768–70. 
67  However, see Rubin’s argument in ibid., pp. 45–48, which, in the context of the Interna-
tional Criminal Court, tended to disagree on this. 
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day that would consider these crimes socially or morally acceptable. Thus, 
similar to piracy, they derive their internationally illegal character from 
the will of the international society, including the Muslim world, either 
through customary law or treaty law.68 The Nuremberg and Tokyo trials 
after the Second World War in 1945 and 1946 respectively are, usually, 
the starting point of modern international criminal law. Novak notes that 
these “were the first attempts to criminalise aggressive war and abuses 
against civilian populations”.69 The Charter of the International Military 
Tribunal at Nuremberg70 is the first formal legal basis for offences consid-
ered prohibited under international criminal law, listing crimes against 
peace, war crimes and crimes against humanity and complicity in commit-
ting them as crimes punishable under international law, and defining each 
one of them in relation to situations of war. The Nuremberg trials were 
followed in 1993 by the establishment of the International Criminal Tri-
bunal for the former Yugoslavia (‘ICTY’), through UN Security Council 
Resolution 827 of 1993, to prosecute persons responsible for war crimes 
committed during the conflicts in the Balkans in the 1990s,71 and the In-
ternational Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (‘ICTR’) established through 
UN Security Council Resolution 955 of 1994 to prosecute persons re-
sponsible for genocide and other serious violations of international hu-
manitarian law committed in Rwanda and neighbouring states between 1 
January 1994 and 31 December 1994,72 and ultimately the establishment 
of the ICC through the ICC Statute73 adopted in 1998. While both the 
ICTY and ICTR were established under Chapter VII of the UN Charter on 
behalf of the international community, the ICC Statute was established by 
a multilateral treaty adopted through international co-operation. While 
                                                   
68  See, for example, the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Gen-
ocide, 9 December 1948, in force 12 January 1951 (http://www.legal-
tools.org/doc/498c38/). 
69  Andrew Novak, The International Criminal Court: An Introduction, Springer, New York, 
2015, p. 8. 
70  Charter of the International Military Tribunal, 8 August 1945 (http://www.legal-
tools.org/doc/64ffdd/). 
71  United Nations Security Council Resolution 827 (1993), UN Doc. S/RES/827(1993), 25 
May 1993 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/dc079b/). 
72  United Nations Security Council Resolution 955 (1994), UN Doc. S/RES/955(1994), 8 
November 1994 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/f5ef47/). 
73  See ICC Statute, supra note 1 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/7b9af9/). 
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Muslim-majority states may not have had much input into the Security 
Council resolutions establishing the ICTY and ICTR, a sizable number of 
them, as well as the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (‘OIC’), partici-
pated and contributed to the debates and adoption of the ICC Statute.74 
The ICTY had jurisdiction for genocide, war crimes, and crimes against 
humanity, while the statute of the ICTR also provided for genocide, 
crimes against humanity and violations of Article 3 common to the Gene-
va Conventions and the Additional Protocol II.75 The ICC Statute also 
recognises genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and the crime 
of aggression as the most serious crimes of concern to the international 
community as a whole, and punishable under international law. 
Evidently, genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and the 
crime of aggression as defined in the statutes of these international tribu-
nals are actions that are equally abhorred under Islamic socio-legal norms. 
These acts come under the general concept of ‘fasád’ (corruption or atroc-
ities), prohibited in the Qurʼánic text 7:56: “Do not [cause] corruption in 
the land, after it has been set right”. These acts are also specifically pro-
hibited under Islamic socio-legal norms regulating warfare, as discussed 
above. Malekian has comparatively identified that these core international 
crimes are equally recognised and punishable under Islamic law.76 
Considering the historical context of international criminal law and 
looking at the preambles of the Charter of the International Military Tri-
bunal at Nuremberg and the Statutes of the ICTY, ICTR, and the ICC, it is 
obvious that the object and purpose of international criminal law is to 
ensure that perpetrators of war crimes are appropriately brought to jus-
tice.77 While bringing the perpetrators of war crimes to justice under in-
ternational criminal law is mainly perceived in terms of punishing the 
perpetrators to serve as deterrent for future offenders, other theoretical 
                                                   
74  See Coalition for the International Criminal Court, “Factsheet: The ICC and the Arab 
World” (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/c315d6/). 
75  Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, 8 November 1994, Articles 1–3 
(http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/8732d6/). 
76  Farhad Malekian, Principles of Islamic International Criminal Law: A Comparative 
Search, Brill, Leiden, 2011, p. 165. See also Bassiouni, 2014, pp. 88–117, see supra note 
21. 
77  See the preambular statements of the Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the 
Major War Criminals of the European Axis, 8 August 1945 (http://www.legal-
tools.org/doc/844f64/). 
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basis of punishment in international criminal law has been proffered by 
scholars on the subject.78 Goldstone has noted that prosecution is not the 
only form of justice, nor necessarily the most appropriate form in every 
case, which highlights the need for a more holistic approach to interna-
tional criminal justice. In that regard, it is important to note that the Pre-
amble of the ICC Statute reflects the social, moral, political and legal ori-
gins of international criminal law as a basis of international criminal jus-
tice as will be analysed later below in relation to the object and purpose 
and the maqáṣid principles respectively. 
It is apparent from the above analysis that there is certainly a com-
mon social, moral and legal objective for international humanitarian law, 
international human rights law and international criminal law under both 
international law and Islamic law respectively, as pillars of international 
criminal justice. This common objective is important to prevent a percep-
tion of moral and legal superiority of one civilisation over the rest, and 
ensure the promotion of international criminal justice through the collec-
tive moral and legal conviction of all civilisations, including Islam. 
3.4. Advancing a Holistic Perspective of International Criminal 
Justice in Relation to the ‘Object and Purpose’ and ‘Maqáṣid’ 
Principles 
The foregoing analyses establish that, while international criminal law 
judgments are an important aspect of international criminal justice, they 
are not the only basis for it. As Malekian observed:79 
[w]hen we talk of the principles of international criminal jus-
tice, we do not necessarily mean only the judgements that 
may be delivered by international criminal courts, but also 
the living structures of international criminal law as it exists 
in the international relations of states. 
International criminal justice therefore requires a holistic perspective that 
combines the objects and purposes of international humanitarian law, in-
ternational human rights law and international criminal law, making not 
                                                   
78  See, generally, Farooq Ḥasan, “The Theoretical Basis of Punishment in International Crim-
inal Law”, in Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law, 1983, vol. 15, no. 1, pp. 
39–60. 
79  Farhad Malekian, Jurisprudence of International Criminal Justice, Cambridge Scholars 
Publishing, Newcastle upon Tyne, 2014, p. 1. 
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only its legal but also its social, moral and political features evident to 
encourage its universal acceptance, especially in the Muslim world in 
relation to Islamic socio-legal norms. Such a holistic perspective will link 
its punitive aspect with its preventive aspect to make the system more 
effective. The need for such complementation was well articulated by the 
former UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, in his report to the Security 
Council in 2004:80 
[I]n matters of justice and the rule of law, an ounce of pre-
vention is worth significantly more than a pound of cure. 
While United Nations efforts have been tailored […] to ad-
dress the grave injustices of war, the root causes of conflict 
have often been left unaddressed. Yet, it is in addressing the 
causes of conflict, through legitimate and just ways, that the 
international community can help prevent a return to conflict 
in the future […] Viewed this way, prevention is the first im-
perative of justice. (emphasis added) 
Thus, international criminal justice must be seen as “the fruit of 
transcultural morality, co-operation, assistance, reciprocity, mutual and 
multilateral tolerances and a combination of different political necessi-
ties”.81 This requires engagement with its social, moral, political, and le-
gal dimensions. Each of these dimensions is reflected in the Preamble of 
the ICC Statute. Pursuant to the object and purpose approach proposed in 
this chapter, relevant provisions of the preamble will be referred to in 
analysing each one of them in relation to Islamic socio-legal norms based 
on the maqáṣid principle to promote international criminal justice in the 
Muslim world. 
3.4.1. Social Dimension of International Criminal Justice 
The social dimension of international criminal justice relates to its societal 
linkages and acceptance. Kennedy observed that international lawyers 
“are constantly searching for better methods to ‘enforce’ their norms in 
international society and feel the need to defend international law when 
enforcement seems unlikely”.82 This can be addressed through a better 
                                                   
80  Report of the Secretary-General, 23 August 2004, para. 4, see supra note 63 
(http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/77bebf/). 
81  Malekian, 2014, p. 1, see supra note 79. 
82  David Kennedy, “New Approaches to Comparative Law: Comparativism and International 
Governance”, in Utah Law Review, 1997, vol. 2, pp. 545–638. 
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appreciation of the social dimension of relevant areas of international law. 
As noted earlier, international criminal justice involves some element of 
global social control, which can be resisted in different societies due to 
different social and cultural variables.83 Such resistance can be conciliated 
through promoting a proper appreciation of the social dimension of inter-
national criminal justice. International criminal justice cannot operate 
simply by imposition, but must be understood in the relevant social con-
text for its acceptability in all societies, including the Muslim world. 
The effectiveness of the social dimension of international criminal 
justice requires two mediations. The first relates to understanding socie-
ties, what they aspire to, what is their conception of justice, and whether 
they perceive that the international criminal justice system can fulfil their 
aspirations of social justice equitably. Bantekas has noted the absence of a 
thorough examination of the social and cultural context within which rel-
evant international criminal justice actors operate.84 The need to under-
stand the social and cultural context that leads to atrocities amounting to 
international crimes cannot be overemphasised. For example, historical 
facts show that genocidal acts are often a consequence of built-up hatred 
of the ‘other’ due to ethnic supremacism and social injustices, while atroc-
ities amounting to war crimes in armed conflicts are often a consequence 
of nationalist supremacism deriving from loyalty to the nation-state above 
respect for human equality, human dignity and universal humanitarianism. 
As noted by Gat: “War has a reputation for being the ultimate expression 
of national affinity and solidarity, of the sharp division between ‘us’ and 
‘them’”,85 and “studies show that the main cause of the post-1815 wars 
has been ethnic-nationalist”.86 This leads to the second mediation, which 
relates to promoting non-territorial common bonds of humanity reflected 
in values of human equality, human dignity, humaneness and social cohe-
                                                   
83  See generally, Martti Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of Interna-
tional Legal Argument, Finnish Lawyers’ Publishing Company, 1989; ibid. 
84  Ilias Bantekas, “The Anthropological Dimension of International Crimes and International 
Criminal Justice”, in Ilias Bantekas and Emmanouela Mylonaki (eds.), Criminological Ap-
proaches to International Criminal Law, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2014, p. 
240. 
85  Azar Gat, Nations: The Long History and Deep Roots of Political Ethnicity and National-
ism, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2013, p. 313. 
86  Ibid., p. 315. 
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sion within all societies, as important foundations for international crimi-
nal justice. 
The promotion of non-territorial common bonds of humanity is re-
flected in the first preambular paragraph of the ICC Statute, which states 
that it is “[c]onscious that all peoples are united by common bonds, their 
cultures pieced together in a shared heritage, and concerned that this deli-
cate mosaic may be shattered at any time”. The consciousness that “all 
peoples are united by common bonds” and the concern that this “may be 
shattered at any time” in the first paragraph of the Preamble emphasises 
the importance of human equality and social justice, nationally and inter-
nationally, as an important first step to achieving a preventive internation-
al criminal justice system. This is where the link between international 
human rights law and international criminal justice is best reflected. The 
common bonds must be promoted internally through state policy and ex-
ternally through international co-operation. Although international crimes 
are committed by individuals during armed conflict, Article 6 of the Char-
ter of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg acknowledged that 
persons to be tried and punished by the tribunal would have been “acting 
in the interest of the European Axis countries”,87 reflecting the complicit 
role of states either by commission or omission. States therefore have an 
important role to play both domestically and internationally in ensuring 
the advancement of social and cultural norms that promote the common 
bonds of humanity for the effectiveness of the social element of interna-
tional criminal justice. The promotion of international human rights and 
good governance in all societies and equal concern for their violations 
thereof should be taken seriously by the international community as part 
of the international criminal justice system. As Boas argues: 
Natural law conceptions of humanity and protection of 
communities are infused in the dialogue of what constitutes 
international criminal justice; these require a sense of an ‘in-
ternational community’ acting ‘collectively’ against certain 
opprobrious behavior. In this way, international criminal jus-
tice is an expression of global community. 
In relation to the Muslim world, it is first necessary to have a proper 
social understanding of Muslim societies, with reference to how Islamic 
                                                   
87  Charter of the International Military Tribunal, 8 August 1945, Article 6 (http://www.legal-
tools.org/doc/64ffdd/). 
3. Islamic Socio-Legal Norms and International Criminal Justice in Context: 
Advancing and ‘Object and Purpose’ cum ‘Maqáṣid’ Approach 
Nuremberg Academy Series No. 2 (2018) – page 71 
social norms are germane to promoting the “common bonds of humanity” 
expressed in the preamble of the ICC Statute and the perception of “inter-
national criminal justice [as] an expression of global community” high-
lighted by Boas. Both the “common bonds of humanity” and the idea of 
“global community” form part of the ends of the general maqáṣid of the 
Sharí‘ah as reflected in the Qurʼánic text 49:13, which is a clear global 
wake-up call for a much-needed functional global community: 
O mankind, We have created you male and female, and ap-
pointed you races and tribes, that you may know one another 
[not that you may despise one another]. Surely the noblest 
among you in the sight of God is the most godfearing of you. 
God is All-knowing, All-aware. 
This Qur’ánic provision is the fundamental basis of Islamic social 
norms in respect of human co-existence, reflecting the common bonds of 
humanity by reference to our common human ancestry and equality of 
birth. Ethnicity is acknowledged as a natural phenomenon that should be 
positively appreciated and not negatively exploited to discriminate against 
or despise one another. Prior to Islam, ethnic resentment was rife in Ara-
bia, leading to constant tribal wars. With the revelation of this verse, 
Prophet Muḥammad is reported to have pronounced: “Oh people! God 
has removed the evils and arrogance of the pre-Islamic period (jáhiliyyah) 
from you”.88 There is consensus among both classical and contemporary 
Qur’ánic exegetes that this verse established the prohibition of racial or 
ethnic resentment and discrimination in Islam as early as the seventh cen-
tury. For example, the thirteenth century Qur’ánic exegete, Al-Bayḍáwí, 
stated that the verse establishes the fact that all human beings are equal 
and there is no basis for superiority on grounds of ethnicity or lineage.89 
Also, Qutb stated in his commentary to this verse that God’s purpose of 
creating humanity into nations, races, and tribes is not to “stir up conflict 
and enmity [but] for the purpose of getting to know one another and living 
                                                   
88  Reported by Al-Tirmidhí and Al-Bayháqí. For reference, see Mashood A. Baderin, “Islam-
ic Law and International Protection of Minority Rights”, in Marie Luisa Frick et al. (eds.), 
Islam and International Law: Engaging Self-Centrism from a Plurality of Perspective, 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden, 2013, p. 320. 
89  Abd Alla Al-Bayḍáwí, “Anwár at-tanzíl wa-asrár at-taʼwíl”, in Heinrich O. Fleischer (ed.), 
Commentarius in Coranium, 1846, vol. 2, p. 276. 
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peacefully together”.90  Similarly, Mawdúdí observed that in this verse 
“the whole of mankind has been addressed to reform it of the great evil 
that has been causing universal disruption in the world, that is, the preju-
dices due to race, colour, language, country and nationality”,91 and ac-
cording to Sháfi’ this verse “proceeds to set down the basis of an all-
comprehensive and all-pervading principle of human equality [and] has 
firmly laid the axe at the false and foolish notions of superiority, born of 
racial arrogance or national conceit”.92 Prophet Muḥammad is reported to 
have re-emphasised this in his last major sermon, stating, inter alia:93 
O People! Be aware that your God is One. An Arab has no 
superiority over a non-Arab and a non-Arab has no superi-
ority over an Arab, and no white person has any superiority 
over a black person, and no black person has any superiority 
over a white person, except on the basis of righteousness. 
The most honourable among you in the sight of God is the 
most righteous […] Let those who are present convey this to 
those who are absent. 
These Islamic injunctions establish strong social norms that can be 
used to promote the effectiveness of the social element of international 
criminal justice as analysed above, not only in the Muslim world but also 
globally. The maqáṣid approach requires that any contrary interpretation 
of the Sharí‘ah that promotes resentment, discrimination, and enmity 
amongst humanity is rejected on grounds of contradicting the maqáṣid of 
the Sharí‘ah. Modern Muslim-majority states, especially those that consti-
tutionally recognise Islam or Islamic law as part of their social order, have 
an obligation to engrain this Islamic norm into their respective social or-
ders to enhance the spirit of the common bonds of humanity as part of the 
general object and purpose of international criminal justice and the gen-
eral maqáṣid of the Sharí‘ah. There is nothing in international law that 
prohibits the use of these Islamic injunctions as a universal mantra for 
promoting the “common bonds of humanity” so important to socially en-
couraging a preventive international criminal justice system globally. 
                                                   
90  Sayyid Qutb (translated by M. Adil Salah and Ashur A. Shais), In the Shade of the Qur’án, 
The Islamic Foundation, Leicester, 2009, vol. XVI, p. 97. 
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1999. 
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3.4.2. Moral Dimension of International Criminal Justice 
The moral dimension of international criminal justice relates to its ethical 
linkages. Morals play a higher justificatory role in international law than 
in domestic law. International law acquires its general legitimacy mostly 
from moral justifications to make it acceptable as law in most societies. 
Generally, morals constitute one of the material sources of international 
law; history is another one, especially in respect of the international 
norms underlying international human rights law, international humanitar-
ian law and international criminal law. In all these specific areas of inter-
national law, morals provide the material substance that is formally 
cloaked with the nature and force of law.94 While law relates to the ques-
tion ‘what?’, morals relate to the question ‘why?’, which is mostly asked 
in relation to international law norms. The challenge to international 
norms in most societies is not simply ‘What is the law?’, but the more 
complex question: ‘Why should the norm be complied with?’. That com-
plex question is not always sufficiently answered by merely saying: ‘Be-
cause that is the law’. Practically, most international norms, including 
those of international criminal justice, are more sustainable on moral justi-
fications than strictly legal arguments in most societies, including the 
Muslim world. In analysing the role of morals in international law, 
Boldizar and Korhonen refer, for example, to Koskenniemi’s argument 
regarding the prohibition of nuclear weapons95 that “the prohibition of the 
‘Killing of the Innocent’ is not to be subjected to legal argumentation, 
even in the mode of justification, because this prohibition is a priori al-
ready stronger and clearer [morally] than any, however, ingenious, legal 
argument”.96 This is not to underestimate the importance of legal argu-
mentation, but to highlight the need to also appreciate the importance of 
the moral argument for the promotion of the concept of international 
criminal justice as a universal norm. Thus, the moral dimension of inter-
national criminal justice requires looking beyond its formal source (the 
                                                   
94  This is by reference to the classification of the sources of law into ‘material sources’ and 
‘formal sources’, with the former being what the latter gives the force of law. See John 
Salmond, Jurisprudence, 7th ed., Sweet and Maxwell, London, 1924, p. 139. 
95  Martti Koskenniemi, “Faith, Identity and the Killing of the Innocent: International Law-
yers and Nuclear Weapons”, in Leiden Journal of International Law, 1997, vol. 10, pp. 
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law) to its material source (morals), which forms its normative foundation. 
Although the ideal in terms of morals is difficult to agree on in most cases, 
the morals underlying international criminal justice can be generally sus-
tained within most moral systems, especially within Islamic moral norms, 
as is argued herein. 
The atrocities prohibited under international criminal law are: geno-
cide,97 crimes against humanity,98 war crimes,99 and the crime of aggres-
sion.100 There is no doubt that all these crimes and their detailed defini-
tions are underpinned by strong moral justifications. The general object 
and purpose in prohibiting them is reflected in the second and third pre-
ambular paragraphs of the ICC Statute, which state: “[m]indful that dur-
ing this century millions of children, women and men have been victims 
of unimaginable atrocities that deeply shock the conscience of humanity” 
and “[r]ecognizing that such grave crimes threaten the peace, security and 
well-being of the world”. These are, obviously, an appeal to human moral 
sentiments to justify the prohibition of those atrocious crimes. 
With regard to Islam, the role of morals is well established in all its 
social-legal norms. Both the Qur’án and the Prophet’s Traditions are re-
plete with moral admonitions as the fundamental basis of devotion, law 
and social interactions. The Prophet Muḥammad is specifically exalted in 
the Qurʼánic text 68:4 as having excellent morals, which according to the 
Qurʼánic text 33:21 Muslims are expected to emulate. The generic 
Qur’ánic term for morals is ‘birr’, translated as righteousness. The im-
portance of morals as a cornerstone of all actions, including law, in Islam 
is reflected in the Qurʼánic text 2:177, which states that righteousness is 
not merely turning one’s face either to the East or West in devotion to God, 
but rather to accompany this with different elements of excellent morals 
in the service of humanity. Similarly, the Qurʼánic text 16:90 provides that 
“God bids to justice and good-doing [to all] and giving to kinsmen; and 
                                                   
97  For the full definition of this crime, see ICC Statute, Article 6, supra note 1 
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He forbids indecency, dishonour and insolence”. The Prophet is also re-
ported to have stated in a Tradition that “I have been sent [by God] to 
perfect good morals”.101 Thus, the morality of prohibiting those atrocities 
under international criminal justice is certainly very justifiable under Is-
lamic socio-legal norms and in conformity with the maqáṣid of the Sha-
rí‘ah. As already identified above, a correlative aspect of the maqáṣid is 
the general prohibition of atrocities (mafsadah) on earth, clearly evi-
denced in the Qurʼánic text 7:56: “Do not [cause] corruption in the land, 
after it has been set right”. 
In relation to the general object and purpose of international crimi-
nal justice to prevent atrocities, as indicated in the preamble of the ICC 
Statute, reference can also be made to the Qurʼánic text 4:75, which estab-
lishes the Islamic moral obligation of assisting the oppressed who cry out 
for rescue and help, and also to the Prophetic Tradition: “Let there be no 
harm and no reciprocation of harm”.102 All these Islamic divine injunc-
tions can serve as reference points for promoting the moral dimension of 
international criminal justice in the Muslim world in relation to the gen-
eral object and purpose of international criminal justice. Emphasising this 
moral dimension can encourage a change in attitude and gradually dimin-
ish the urge to commit the prohibited atrocities globally, especially in the 
Muslim world. 
3.4.3. Political Dimension of International Criminal Justice 
The political dimension of international criminal justice relates to authori-
ty and power relations amongst states and “the real question is how that 
relationship is managed and to what end”.103 A notable hurdle for interna-
tional criminal justice in that regard is the perceived selectivity and dou-
ble standards within the international system.104 This affects the political 
legitimacy of international criminal justice adversely, as impartiality is 
essential for its effectiveness. Concerns are often raised by developing 
countries, including Muslim-majority states, about the apparent political 
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Islam and International Criminal Law and Justice 
Nuremberg Academy Series No. 2 (2018) – page 76 
inequality within the international system, as reflected in Article 27(3) of 
the UN Charter since 1945,105 giving a veto power advantage to the five 
permanent members of UN Security Council on all substantive matters. 
This political inequality is indirectly incorporated into the ICC Statute 
through Articles 13(b) and 16, which grant the UN Security Council pow-
er of political interference in referring matters of international criminal 
justice to the ICC,106 despite unsuccessful agitation for the past two dec-
ades for a reformed and better-balanced Security Council. There is appar-
ent concern among states of the Global South about the Security Council’s 
selective use of its referral powers under the ICC Statute based on politi-
cal expediency to favour the permanent members’ political interests. Most 
developing states, including Muslim-majority states, perceive that the 
powerful states can use their political advantage to manipulate the interna-
tional system to make themselves immune from liability under the inter-
national criminal justice system. Thakur bluntly argues that the “initiative 
of international criminal justice meant to protect vulnerable people from 
brutal national rulers has been subverted into an instrument of powerful 
against vulnerable countries” for political expediency.107 The former UN 
High Commissioner for Human Rights, Louise Arbour, also highlighted 
that “there would be little hope for the promotion of the rule of law inter-
nationally if the most powerful international body makes it subservient to 
the rule of political expediency”.108 
International criminal justice can only be effectively sustained 
through equitable international political co-operation. In relating this to 
the object and purpose of international criminal justice, the fourth pream-
bular paragraph of the ICC Statute affirms that “the most serious crimes 
of concern to the international community as a whole must not go unpun-
ished and that their effective prosecution must be ensured by taking 
measures at the national level and by enhancing international coopera-
tion”, while the fifth preambular paragraph indicates a determination to 
collectively “put an end to impunity for the perpetrators of these crimes 
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and thus to contribute to the prevention of such crimes”.109 Both the en-
hancement of international co-operation and determination to put an end 
to impunity can only be achieved through an equitable international polit-
ical relationship that transcends the narrow interest of any one or group of 
states to the detriment of the international criminal justice system. The 
need for international politics of equality and co-operation must be 
strongly promoted to enhance international criminal justice globally, par-
ticularly in the Muslim world. 
From the perspective of maqáṣid, Islam enjoins international co-
operation based on equity, justice and spirit of solidarity in dealing with 
international political problems. This is inspired by the Qurʼánic text 
49:9–10, which enjoins collective action based on equity, justice and soli-
darity: 
If two parties of the believers fight, put things right between 
them; then, if one of them is insolent against the other, fight 
the insolent one till it reverts to God’s commandment. If it 
reverts, set things right between them equitably and be just. 
Surely God loves the just. The believers indeed are brothers; 
so set things right between your two [contending] brothers 
and fear God; haply so you will find mercy’ (emphasis add-
ed). 
Hamidullah describes this Qur’ánic provision as a fundamental ob-
jective of Islamic international law.110 The provision emphasises the im-
portance of equity, justice and solidarity as essential factors of interna-
tional co-operation and collective action. Many other Qur’ánic provisions 
corroborate this, including the Qurʼánic text 5:2: “[L]et not [your] detesta-
tion for a people, who barred you from the Holy Mosque move you to 
commit aggression. Help one another to piety and godfearing; do not help 
each other to sin and enmity”; and the Qurʼánic text 5:8: “[Let not [your] 
detestation for a people move you not to be equitable [towards them] – 
that is nearer to godfearing”, specifically enjoins Muslims not to act ineq-
uitably even against a hostile people or nation. Based on both the object 
and purpose of international criminal justice and the maqásid of the Sha-
rí‘ah, it is essential to imbibe this Islamic injunction of equity and solidar-
ity into the political dimension of international criminal justice to remedy 
                                                   
109  ICC Statute, Preamble, see supra note 1 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/7b9af9/). 
110  Hamidullah, 1977, p. 178, see supra note 51. 
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the political double-standards, and make it more appealing particularly to 
the Muslim-majority states, which tend to perceive the system as having 
equitable deficits in its political dimension. Doing so would serve as a big 
boost for enhancing international criminal justice globally, but particularly 
in the Muslim world. 
3.4.4. Legal Dimension of International Criminal Justice 
The legal dimension of international criminal justice relates to the appli-
cation of its principles through the courts. This climaxed in the creation of 
the ICC as the main and permanent international court for bringing viola-
tors of core international crimes to trial. The general object and purpose of 
the legal dimension of international criminal justice is reflected in the 
ninth and eleventh preambular paragraphs of the ICC Statute which state 
that, in the determination to meet the social, moral and political ends of 
international criminal justice “for the sake of present and future genera-
tions”, the ICC is established to exercise legal jurisdiction “over the most 
serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole”, 
based on the resolve “to guarantee lasting respect for the enforcement of 
international justice”. However, the ICC may only exercise jurisdiction 
where national legal systems fail do so or where a state is unwilling or has 
no capability to prosecute international criminal offenders.111 States, as 
members of the international community, have the primary responsibility 
to bring violators of serious crimes of concern to the international com-
munity to justice under their respective domestic legal systems. The sys-
tem envisages all states supporting the legality of international criminal 
justice and prosecuting offenders when necessary. This requires states to 
have effective domestic legal systems that ensure fair trial and due pro-
cess leading to substantive justice and affording alleged offenders ade-
quate opportunity to defend themselves. 
Currently, several Muslim-majority states are parties and signatories 
to the ICC Statute.112 This raises the question of whether Muslim-majority 
states whose domestic legal systems are based on or influenced by the 
Sharí‘ah can provide the requisite criminal justice system for the effective 
                                                   
111  See ICC Statute, tenth preambular paragraph and Article 1, supra note 1 (http://www.legal-
tools.org/doc/7b9af9/). 
112  International Criminal Court, “The State Parties to the Rome Statute”, available on the web 
site of the Assembly of States Parties. 
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enforcement of international criminal law domestically. There is a percep-
tion, particularly in the West, that legal systems based on the Sharí‘ah 
cannot generally provide adequate criminal justice of international stand-
ard. While it is true that some of the criminal punishments prescribed by 
the Sharí‘ah are contrary to international human rights law, the Sharí‘ah 
generally enjoins justice, fairness and due process in criminal trials that 
are perfectly commensurate with international standards. Many verses in 
the Qur’án and Prophetic Traditions emphasise the maintenance of justice 
and equity in legal proceedings. For example, the Qurʼánic text 4:135 
enjoins that justice be maintained “even though it be against yourselves, 
or your parents and kinsmen, whether the man be rich or poor”, and the 
Qurʼánic text 16:90 instructs: “Surely God bids to justice and good-doing 
[…] and you have made God your surety; surely God knows the things 
you do”. Doing justice is considered a duty to God, from which emanate 
the rights to equality and fairness for all without regard to status, race, 
gender or religion. The notion that the Crown or King can do no wrong 
has no place under Islamic law and thus presidents and heads of state are 
not immune from facing justice (with the opportunity to legally defend 
themselves) for alleged international crimes. However, the creation of 
necessary institutions and procedural rules for upholding justice as pre-
scribed by the Sharí‘ah is the responsibility of respective Muslim-
majority states. The need to prosecute offenders and violators of both do-
mestic and international law is well recognised under Islamic law as the 
Qur’án provides specific punishment for ḥudúd and qiṣáṣ offences, while 
the provision in the Qurʼánic text 4:16, “[a]nd when two of you commit 
indecency, punish them both”, is understood as authority for the State to 
prescribe punishments for all other offences known as ta‘zír. Thus, Mus-
lim-majority states have a duty under Islamic law to establish judicial 
institutions with adequate fair trial and due processes for criminal trials 
that meet international standards. Both the object and purpose of the legal 
dimension of international criminal justice and the specific maqṣúd of 
punishing crimes under the Sharí‘ah justifies the need for Muslim-
majority states to bring offenders of heinous international crimes to justice 
under their domestic legal systems. 
With reference to armed conflicts, regular combatants of Muslim-
majority states that apply Islamic law are generally expected to comply 
with the rules of warfare as prescribed by both Islamic law and interna-
tional humanitarian law, and any crimes committed in violation of interna-
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tional criminal justice can be prosecuted under the domestic laws of the 
State; failing this, they may be subject to the jurisdiction of the ICC. 
However, there is one area of apparent legal conflict between aspects of 
classical Islamic jurisprudence and international humanitarian law in re-
spect of atrocities being committed by rebellious groups such as ISIS, Al-
Shabáb and Boko Ḥarám in different parts of the Muslim world today. 
Traditionally, there is an established jurisprudential view under classical 
Islamic international law (al-siyar) that rebellious groups with established 
authority, some territorial control and sustained resistance (man’ah) 
against the main political authority based on some speculative interpreta-
tion (ta’wíl) of Islamic sources, would not be punishable by the main po-
litical authority for actions they committed within the territory they con-
trolled during the conflict. For example, Al-Shaybání expressed the view 
that “when such rebels repent and accept the authority of the government, 
they should not be punished for the damage they caused during their re-
bellion”. Contextually, this rule is perceived to offer incentives to rebels 
for complying with the laws of war, thereby reducing the sufferings of 
civilians and ordinary citizens. However, this rule is neither absolute nor a 
licence for rebellious groups to commit heinous crimes with impunity. 
Based on the maqáṣid principle, where such rebels violate the established 
laws of war with impunity, they would be liable for all atrocities they 
committed during the rebellion even if they had established authority and 
some territorial control, and sought to justify their atrocities by reference 
to some speculative interpretations of the law.113 Thus, with regard to the 
legal dimension of international criminal justice, it is submitted, particu-
larly with reference to the object and purpose and maqáṣid principles, that 
members of ISIS, Al-Shabáb and Boko Ḥarám would be liable to face 
justice and, where convicted, liable to be punished for all the atrocities 
committed by them in violation of the rules of warfare under both con-
temporary international humanitarian law and Islamic humanitarian law. 
3.5. Conclusion 
Essentially, international law cannot operate in a vacuum, but must una-
voidably interact with domestic legal systems and cultures for its imple-
                                                   
113  See, generally, Sadia Tabassum, “Combatants, Not Bandits: The Status of Rebels in Islam-
ic Law”, in International Review of the Red Cross, 2011, vol. 93, no. 881, pp. 1–19. See 
also Bassiouni, 2014, p. 139, supra note 21. 
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mentation. Thus, international law is structured to be implemented pri-
marily by states within their domestic legal systems, with international 
tribunals stepping in only when domestic implementation fails. This is 
reflected, for example, in the general requirement to exhaust all available 
domestic remedies before international human rights tribunals can have 
jurisdiction for human rights trials and also in the complementarity rule, 
which gives the ICC jurisdiction to try international crimes only when 
states fail to or have no capacity to do so. This highlights the need to pro-
mote synergy between international law generally and relevant domestic 
systems of the world. The greater the synergy, the greater would be the 
prospects of acceptance and effective implementation of international 
norms within domestic systems. It is in that context that this chapter has 
critically engaged with the concept of international criminal justice and 
analysed how to enhance its acceptance and effectiveness in the Muslim 
world, highlighting the role of Islamic socio-legal norms (broadly defined 
as social, moral, political and legal norms) in that regard. In doing so, the 
chapter not only contributes to, but changes, the traditional debate in two 
important aspects that will hopefully deepen the discourse on the relation-
ship between international criminal justice and Islamic socio-legal norms 
beyond bare legal formalism. 
The first aspect is that, in promoting international criminal justice, 
the traditional approach has been to focus mainly on the substantive legal 
provisions of relevant treaties, without much attention to the object and 
purpose behind the legal provisions or the moral justifications that sustain 
the concept of international criminal justice. While that approach may 
impose a compulsive legal obligation on States Parties to the relevant 
treaties, which they may or may not fulfil in practice, its persuasive and 
justificatory effect in attracting compliance is very limited universally. In 
challenging that approach, this chapter has advanced a more holistic ap-
proach to international criminal justice, involving its social, moral, politi-
cal and legal dimensions underpinned by the reference to the object and 
purpose principle of international law. Similarly, the second aspect is that, 
in engaging Islamic socio-legal norms with the application of internation-
al criminal justice within the domestic systems of Muslim-majority states, 
the traditional approach has been to focus mainly on the substantive in-
junctions of the Sharí‘ah without much attention to the maqáṣid behind 
those injunctions. That approach also does not absorb the benevolent na-
ture of the Sharí‘ah and conceals the common grounds it shares with the 
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objectives of international criminal justice. The chapter has also chal-
lenged that approach by advancing the maqáṣid principle of Islamic law. 
In conclusion, the arguments herein pierce the legal veil of both in-
ternational criminal justice and Islamic law by moving the discourse of 
their relationship beyond strict engagement with legal formalism to in-
clude consideration and appreciation of the social, moral and political 
norms that constitute the justification behind the legal provisions. It is 
submitted that this approach can be significantly persuasive and could 
consequently facilitate better acceptance and effective application of in-
ternational criminal justice in the Muslim world. 
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